Abstract. Given two elliptic curves over a finite field having the same cardinality and endomorphism ring, it is known that the curves admit an isogeny between them, but finding such an isogeny is believed to be computationally difficult. The fastest known classical algorithm takes exponential time, and prior to our work no faster quantum algorithm was known. Recently, public-key cryptosystems based on the presumed hardness of this problem have been proposed as candidates for post-quantum cryptography. In this paper, we give a subexponential-time quantum algorithm for constructing isogenies, assuming the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis (but with no other assumptions). Our algorithm is based on a reduction to a hidden shift problem, together with a new subexponential-time algorithm for evaluating isogenies from kernel ideals (under only GRH), and represents the first nontrivial application of Kuperberg's quantum algorithm for the hidden shift problem. This result suggests that isogeny-based cryptosystems may be uncompetitive with more mainstream quantum-resistant cryptosystems such as lattice-based cryptosystems.
Introduction
We consider the problem of constructing an isogeny between two given isogenous ordinary elliptic curves defined over a finite field F q and having the same endomorphism ring. (Two such curves are called horizontally isogenous.) This problem has led to several applications in elliptic curve cryptography, both constructive and destructive. The fastest known probabilistic algorithm for solving this problem is the algorithm of Galbraith and Stolbunov [18] , based on the work of Galbraith, Hess, and Smart [17] . Their algorithm is exponential, with a worst-case (and average-case) running time roughly proportional to 4 √ q. Although quantum attacks are known against several cryptographic protocols of an algebraic nature [12, 19, 34] , until now there has been no nontrivial quantum algorithm for constructing isogenies. The difficulty of this problem has led to various constructions of public-key cryptosystems based on finding isogenies, beginning with a proposal of Couveignes [10] . More recently, Rostovtsev and Stolbunov [29] and Stolbunov [36] proposed refined versions of these cryptosystems with the specific aim of obtaining cryptographic protocols that resist attacks by quantum computers.
In this work, we give a subexponential-time quantum algorithm for constructing an isogeny between two given horizontally isogenous elliptic curves, and show that the running time of our algorithm is bounded above by L q ( of quantum computers. At present, isogeny-based cryptosystems are not especially attractive since their performance is poor compared to other quantum-resistant cryptosystems, such as latticebased cryptography [20] . Nevertheless, they represent a distinct family of cryptosystems worthy of analysis (for reasons of diversity if nothing else, given the small number of quantum-resistant public-key cryptosystem families available [27] ). Since isogeny-based cryptosystems already perform poorly at moderate security levels [36, Table 1 ], any improved attacks such as ours would seem to disqualify such systems from consideration in a post-quantum world.
Contributions
Our first main contribution, described in Section 5, is a reduction from the problem of isogeny construction to the abelian hidden shift problem. While a connection between isogenies and hidden shifts was noted previously by Stolbunov [36] , we observe that the reduction gives an injective hidden shift problem. This allows us to apply an algorithm of Kuperberg [25] to solve the hidden shift problem using a subexponential number of queries to certain functions. This reduction constitutes the first nontrivial application of Kuperberg's algorithm outside of the black-box setting.
The reduction to the hidden shift problem alone does not immediately give a subexponentialtime algorithm for computing isogenies, because one must consider the time required to compute the hiding functions. Indeed, prior to our work there was no known subexponential-time algorithm to evaluate these functions. Our second main contribution, described in Section 4, is a subexponentialtime (classical) algorithm to compute the isogeny star operator, which is defined as a certain action of an ideal class group on a set of elliptic curves. In this way we can compute the hiding functions in subexponential time and thus obtain a subexponential-time reduction to the hidden shift problem. Unlike previous algorithms for isogeny computation [16, 17, 23] , our runtime analysis assumes only GRH, whereas all previous subexponential-time algorithms for isogeny problems have required additional heuristic assumptions. We achieve this improvement using expansion properties of a certain Cayley graph [22] . The same idea can also be used to obtain subexponential algorithms (under only GRH) for evaluating isogenies (see Remark 4.9) . In addition, Bisson [4] has shown that our method yields a subexponential algorithm for computing endomorphism rings of ordinary elliptic curves under GRH.
Kuperberg's algorithm for the abelian hidden shift problem uses superpolynomial space (i.e., a quantum computer with superpolynomially many qubits), so the same is true of the most straightforward version of our algorithm. Since it is difficult to build quantum computers with many qubits, this feature could limit the applicability of our result. However, we also obtain an algorithm using polynomial space by taking advantage of an alternative approach to the abelian hidden shift problem due to Regev [28] . Regev only explicitly considered the case of the hidden shift problem in a cyclic group whose order is a power of 2, and even in that case did not compute the constant in the exponent of the running time. We fill both of these gaps in our work, showing that the hidden shift problem in any finite abelian group A can be solved in time L |A| ( 1 2 , √ 2) by a quantum computer using only polynomial space. Consequently, we give a polynomial-space quantum algorithm for isogeny construction using time
. The group relevant to isogeny construction is not always cyclic, so the extension to general abelian groups is necessary for our application.
Related work
Our algorithm for evaluating the isogeny star operator is based on reducing an ideal modulo principal ideals to obtain a smooth ideal. This idea is originally due to Galbraith, Hess, and Smart [17] .
Bröker, Charles, and Lauter [7] and Jao and Soukharev [23] also use this idea to give algorithms for evaluating isogenies. Bisson and Sutherland [5] use a similar smoothing technique to compute endomorphism rings in subexponential time. We stress that, with the exception of [7] , which is restricted in scope to small discriminants, all the results mentioned above make heuristic assumptions of varying severity [5, §4] [17, p. 37] [23, p. 224 ] in addition to the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis in the course of proving their respective runtime claims. Our work is the first to achieve provably subexponential running time with no heuristic assumptions other than GRH. In practice, the heuristic algorithms in [5] and [23] run slightly faster than our algorithms in Section 4, because they make use of an optimized exponent distribution (originating from [5] ) that minimizes the number of large degree isogenies appearing in the smooth factorization. Our work does not use this optimization, because doing so would reintroduce the need for additional heuristic assumptions.
An alternative approach to computing isogenies, given in Couveignes [10, p. 11] and Stolbunov [36, p. 227], is to treat the class group as a Z-module and use lattice basis reduction to compute the isogeny star operator. In practice, the lattice-based approach works well for moderate parameter sizes. However, since it amounts to solving the closest vector problem, the method asymptotically requires exponential time (even with known quantum algorithms), and thus is slower than our approach.
Isogenies
For general background on elliptic curves, we refer the reader to Silverman [35] .
Let E and E ′ be elliptic curves defined over a field F . An isogeny φ : E → E ′ is an algebraic morphism satisfying φ(∞) = ∞. The degree of an isogeny is its degree as an algebraic map. The endomorphism ring End(E) is the set of isogenies from E(F ) to itself. This set forms a ring under pointwise addition and composition.
When F is a finite field, the rank of End(E) as a Z-module is either 2 or 4. We say E is supersingular if the rank is 4, and ordinary otherwise. A supersingular curve cannot be isogenous to an ordinary curve. Most elliptic curves are ordinary (in particular, supersingular curves have density zero [32] ), and most current proposals for isogeny-based cryptography (including all published isogeny-based public-key cryptosystems) use ordinary curves. Thus, in this paper we restrict our attention to ordinary elliptic curves. It remains an interesting open problem to study cryptographic applications of isogenies between supersingular curves and to better understand the computational difficulty of computing such isogenies, but we do not address this issue.
Over a finite field F q , two elliptic curves E and E ′ are isogenous if and only if #E(F q ) = #E ′ (F q ) [37] . The endomorphism ring of an ordinary elliptic curve over a finite field is an imaginary quadratic order O ∆ of discriminant ∆ < 0. The set of all isomorphism classes (overF q ) of isogenous curves with endomorphism ring O ∆ is denoted Ell q,n (O ∆ ), where n is the cardinality of any such curve. We represent elements of Ell q,n (O ∆ ) by taking the j-invariant of any representative curve in the isomorphism class.
An isogeny between two curves having the same endomorphism ring is called a horizontal isogeny [15] . Likewise, we say that two isogenous curves are horizontally isogenous if their endomorphism rings are equal. Any separable horizontal isogeny φ : E → E ′ between curves in Ell q,n (O ∆ ) can be specified, up to isomorphism, by giving E and ker φ [35, III. 
where 
Following [11] , we refer to G = Cl(O ∆ ) as the ring class group of ∆. Observe that by Remark 1.2(a) of [22] , Corollary 1.3 of [22] applies to the ring class group G, since ring class groups are quotients of narrow ray class groups [11, p. 160] . By Corollary 1.3 of [22] , Theorem 2.1 holds for all sufficiently large values of |∆|, i.e., for all but finitely many |∆|. To prove the theorem for all |∆|, simply take a larger (but still finite) value of C.
Corollary 2.2 Theorem 2.1 still holds with the set A redefined as
where m is any integer having at most O(x 1/2−ε log |∆|) prime divisors.
Proof. The alternative definition of the set A differs from the original definition by no more than O(x 1/2−ε log |∆|) primes. As stated in [22, p. 1497] , the contribution of these primes can be absorbed into the error term O(x 1/2 log(x) log(xq)), and hence does not affect the conclusion of the theorem. 
, given j(E) and j(E ′ ). We refer to [b] as the quotient of j(E) and j(E ′ ). The computational infeasibility of finding quotients in Ell q,n (O ∆ ) is a necessary condition for the security of isogeny-based cryptosystems [10, §3][36, §7]. In the remainder of this paper, we present our subexponential algorithm for evaluating quotients in Ell q,n (O ∆ ) on a quantum computer. A notable property of isogeny-based cryptosystems is that they do not require the ability to evaluate the isogeny star operator efficiently on arbitrary inputs. It is enough to sample from random smooth ideals (for which * can be evaluated efficiently) when performing operations such as key generation [10, §5.4] [36, §6.2]. However, to attack these cryptosystems using our approach, we do require the ability to evaluate the isogeny star operator on arbitrary inputs. We turn to this problem in the next section.
Computing the isogeny star operator
In this section, we describe a new classical (i.e., non-quantum) algorithm to evaluate the isogeny star operator. All notation is as in Section 2. Given an ideal class [b] in Cl(O ∆ ), and a j-invariant E of an ordinary elliptic curve of endomorphism ring O ∆ over F q , we wish to evaluate
For convenience, we denote L max{|∆|,q} ( 2 ), which is subexponential in the input size. For clarity, we present our algorithms and analysis in full instead of as "patches" to existing work. We emphasize that the basic structure of these algorithms appeared in prior work; our main contribution is to the analysis, which is facilitated by small changes to the algorithms. Specifically, Algorithm 1 is based on [ 
Computing a relation. Given an ideal class
, with respect to a factor base
f , with the additional property (cf. Proposition 4.5) that the L 1 -norm |z| 1 of z is less than O(ln |∆|) for some absolute implied constant (here the L 1 norm of a vector denotes the sum of the absolute values of its coordinates). Algorithm 1 is similar to Algorithm 11.2 in [8] , except that we impose a constraint on |v| 1 in Step 5 in order to keep |z| 1 small, and (for performance reasons) we use Bernstein's algorithm instead of trial division to find smooth elements. We remark that Corollary 9.3.12 of [8] together with the restriction C > 1 in Theorem 2.1 implies that there exists a value of t satisfying the inequality in Algorithm 1.
Computing j(E ′ ). Algorithm 2 is the main algorithm for evaluating the isogeny star operator. It takes as input a discriminant ∆ < 0, an ideal class [b] ∈ Cl(O ∆ ), and a j-invariant j(E) ∈ Ell q,n (O ∆ ), and produces the element j(
Algorithm 1 Computing a relation
Input: ∆, q, n, z, [b] , and an integer t satisfying C
Compute a factor base consisting of split primes; discard any primes dividing qn to obtain a new factor base
Select v ∈ Z f 0..|∆|−1 uniformly at random subject to the condition that |v|1 = t 6:
Calculate the reduced ideal av in the ideal class
Set S ← S ∪ N (av) 8: end for 9: Using Bernstein's algorithm [3] , find a P-smooth element N (av) ∈ S (if one exists), or else return nil 10: Find the prime factorization of the integer N (av) 11: Using Theorem 3.1 of Seysen [33] on the prime factorization of N (av), factor the ideal av over F to obtain av = F a for some a ∈ Z
Compute a sequence of isogenies (φ1, . . . , φs) such that the composition φc : E → Ec of the sequence has kernel E[p
the primes dividing qn is necessary for the computation of the isogenies in the final step of the algorithm.
Algorithm 2 is correct since the ideals b and F z belong to the same ideal class, and thus act identically on Ell q,n (O ∆ ).
Runtime analysis
Here we determine the theoretical running time of Algorithm 2, as well as the optimal value of the parameter z in Algorithm 1. As is typical for subexponential-time factorization algorithms involving a factor base, these two quantities depend on each other, and hence both are calculated simultaneously.
Proposition 4.1 The running time of Algorithm 1 is at most
Proof.
Step 1 of Algorithm 1 takes time L(z) [8, Lemmas 11.3.1 and 11.3.2].
Step 2 of the algorithm requires L(z) norm computations.
Step 3 is negligible.
Step 6 requires C ln |∆| multiplications in the class group, each of which requires O((ln |∆|) 1+ε ) bit operations [30] . Hence the for loop in Steps 4-8 has running time L(
Bernstein's algorithm [3] in Step 9 has a running
) is the combined size of S and P. Finding the prime factorization in Step 10 costs L(z) using trial division, and Seysen's algorithm [33, Thm.
3.1] in
Step 11 has negligible cost under ERH (and hence GRH). Accordingly, we find that the running time is
as desired. 
Observe that m has at most O(log q) prime divisors, and
Therefore Corollary 2. ). Hence, by Corollary 2.2, the probability that a v lies in S is at least 1 2
Finally, Theorem 9.3.11 of [8] states that √ |∆| |G| ≥ 1 ln |∆| . Hence the probability that a v is F -smooth is at least
as desired. The following proposition shows that the relation vector z produced by Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to have small coefficients. 
Proof. We have shown that Algorithm 1 has running time L(z) + L( 1 4z ) and success probability at least 1 − 1 e . Assuming that it succeeds, the computation of the individual isogenies φ i in Step 2 of Algorithm 2 proceeds in one of two ways, depending on whether the characteristic of F q is large [7,
. The large characteristic algorithm fails when the characteristic is small, whereas the small characteristic algorithm succeeds in all situations, but is slightly slower in large characteristic. For simplicity, we consider only the latter, and more general, algorithm.
The general algorithm proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we compute the kernel polynomial of the isogeny. The time to perform one such calculation is O((ℓ(ln q) max(ℓ, ln q) Step 2 is at most
By Proposition 4.5, this expression is at most
The theorem follows.
Corollary 4.7 Under GRH, Algorithm 2 has a worst-case running time of at most
2 ). Proof. Using the inequality |∆| ≤ 4q, we may rewrite Theorem 4.6 in terms of q. We obtain the following upper bound for the running time:
The optimal choice of z = ).
Remark 4.9. Our algorithm for computing the isogeny star operator readily extends to an algorithm for evaluating isogenies in subexponential time. As in [7, 23] , we specify an isogeny φ : E → E ′ by providing the ideal b ⊂ End(E) = O ∆ corresponding to the kernel of φ. To distinguish between isogenies that are identical up to isomorphism, we define a normalized isogeny [6, 7] to be one where φ * (w E ′ ) = w E . Algorithm 2 applied to the input b yields an (unnormalized) isogeny φ c : E → E c isomorphic to the desired isogeny φ. To find the normalized isogeny, we must evaluate the necessary isomorphism explicitly. This can be easily done by using [23 
A quantum algorithm for constructing isogenies
Our quantum algorithm for constructing isogenies uses a simple reduction to the abelian hidden shift problem. To define this problem, let A be a known finite abelian group (with the group operation written multiplicatively) and let f 0 , f 1 : A → S be black-box functions, where S is a known finite set. We say that f 0 , f 1 hide a shift s ∈ A if f 0 is injective and f 1 (x) = f 0 (xs) (i.e., f 1 is a shifted version of f 0 ). The goal of the hidden shift problem is to determine s using queries to such black-box functions. Note that this problem is equivalent to the hidden subgroup problem in the A-dihedral group, the nonabelian group A ⋊ Z 2 where Z 2 acts on A by inversion. Isogeny construction is easily reduced to the hidden shift problem using the group action defined in Section 2. Given horizontally isogenous curves E 0 , E 1 with endomorphism ring O ∆ , we define functions
Lemma 5.1. The function f 0 is injective and
Proof. Since * is a group action, Note that a similar connection between isogenies and hidden shift problems was described in [36, Section 7.2]. However, that paper did not recognize the significance of the reduction, and in particular did not appreciate the role played by injectivity. Without the assumption that f 0 is injective, the hidden shift problem can be as hard as the search problem, and hence requires exponentially many queries [2] (although for non-injective functions f 0 with appropriate structure, such as the Legendre symbol, the non-injective hidden shift problem can be solved by a quantum computer in polynomial time [12] ). On the other hand, injectivity implies that the problem has polynomial quantum query complexity [13] , allowing for the possibility of faster quantum algorithms.
This reduction allows us to apply quantum algorithms for the hidden shift problem to construct isogenies. The (injective) hidden shift problem can be solved in quantum subexponential time assuming we can evaluate the group action in subexponential time. The latter is possible due to Algorithm 2.
We consider two different approaches to solving the hidden shift problem in subexponential time on a quantum computer. The first, due to Kuperberg [25] , has a faster running time but requires superpolynomial space. The second approach generalizes an algorithm of Regev [28] . It uses only polynomial space, but is slower than Kuperberg's original algorithm.
Method 1: Kuperberg's algorithm. Kuperberg's approach to the abelian hidden shift problem is based on the idea of performing a Clebsch-Gordan sieve on coset states. The following appears as Theorem 7.1 of [25] . , where n is the length of the output, uniformly for all finitely generated abelian groups.
In our context, 2 O(
regardless of the value of the implied constant in the exponent, since the exponent on the left has no ln ln |∆| term, whereas L(0) does. As mentioned above, Kuperberg's algorithm also requires superpolynomial space (specifically, it uses 2 We now return to the original problem of constructing isogenies. Note that to use the hidden shift approach, the group structure of Cl(O ∆ ) must be known. Given ∆, it is straightforward to compute Cl(O ∆ ) using existing quantum algorithms (see the proof of Theorem 5.4). Thus, we assume for simplicity that the discriminant ∆ is given as part of the input. This requirement poses no difficulty, since all existing proposals for isogeny-based public-key cryptosystems [10, 29, 36] stipulate that O ∆ is a maximal order, in which case its discriminant can be computed easily: simply calculate the trace t(E) of the curve using Schoof's algorithm [31], and factor t(E) 2 − 4q to obtain the fundamental discriminant ∆ (note of course that factoring is easy on a quantum computer [34]).
Remark 5.3.
One can conceivably imagine a situation where one is asked to construct an isogeny between two given isogenous curves of unknown but identical endomorphism ring. Although we are not aware of any cryptographic applications of this scenario, it presents no essential difficulty. Bisson [4] has shown using Corollary 2.2 that the discriminant ∆ of an elliptic curve can be computed in L q ( ) time under only GRH (assuming that factoring is easy).
Algorithm 3 Isogeny construction
Input: A finite field Fq, a discriminant ∆ < 0, and Weierstrass equations of horizontally isogenous elliptic curves E0, E1 Output:
Solve the hidden shift problem defined by functions f0, f1 :
Assuming ∆ is known, we decompose Cl(O ∆ ) as a direct sum of cyclic groups, with a known generator for each, and then solve the hidden shift problem. The overall procedure is described in Algorithm 3.
Theorem 5.4. Assuming GRH, Algorithm 3 runs in time
L q ( 1 2 , √ 3 2 ) (respectively, L q ( 1 2 , √ 3 2 + √ 2
)) using Theorem 5.1 (respectively, Theorem 5.2) to solve the hidden shift problem.
Proof. We perform Step 1 using [9, Algorithm 10], which determines the structure of an abelian group given a generating set and a unique representation for the group elements. We represent the elements uniquely using reduced quadratic forms, and we use the fact that, under ERH (and hence GRH), the set of ideal classes of norm at most 6 ln 2 |∆| forms a generating set [1, p. 376]. By Theorem 5.1 (resp. Theorem 5.2), Step 2 uses
) evaluations of the functions f i . By Corollary 4.7, these functions can be evaluated in time
2 ) using Algorithm 2, assuming GRH. Overall, Step 2 takes time L q (
is used. The cost of
Remark 5.5. Using the improved algorithm for evaluating the isogeny star operator described in Remark 4.8, the running time of Algorithm 3 is improved to L q (
) using Theorem 5.1 to solve the hidden shift problem (requiring superpolynomial space), and to L q (
) using Theorem 5.2 (requiring only polynomial space).
Remark 5.6. The running time of the algorithm is ultimately limited by two factors: the best known quantum algorithm for the hidden shift problem runs in superpolynomial time, and the same holds for the best known (classical or quantum) algorithm for computing the isogeny star operator. Improving only one of these results to take polynomial time would still result in a superpolynomialtime algorithm. A Subexponential-time and polynomial-space quantum algorithm for the general abelian hidden shift problem Following Kuperberg's discovery of a subexponential-time quantum algorithm for the hidden shift problem in any finite abelian group A [25] , Regev presented a modification of Kuperberg's algorithm that requires only polynomial space, with a slight increase in the running time [28] . However, Regev only explicitly considered the case A = Z 2 n , and while he showed that the running time is L |A| ( 1 2 , c), he did not determine the value of the constant c.
In this appendix we describe a polynomial-space quantum algorithm for the general abelian hidden shift problem using time
. We use several of the same techniques employed by Kuperberg [25, Algorithm 5.1 and Theorem 7.1] to go beyond the case A = Z 2 n , adapted to work with a Regev-style sieve that only uses polynomial space.
Let A = Z N1 × · · · × Z Nt be a finite abelian group. Consider the hidden shift problem with hidden shift s = (s 1 , . . . , s t ) ∈ A. By Fourier sampling, one (coherent) evaluation of the hiding functions f 0 , f 1 can produce the state
with a known value x = (x 1 , . . . , x t ) ∈ R A (see for example the proof of Theorem 7.1 in [25] ), where x ∈ R A denotes that x occurs uniformly at random from A. For simplicity, we begin by considering the case where A = Z N is cyclic. Then Fourier sampling produces states
where x ∈ R Z N is known and ω := e 2πi/N . If we could make states |ψ x with chosen values of x, then we could determine s. In particular, the following observation is attributed to Peter Høyer in [25] :
Lemma A.1. Given one copy each of the states |ψ 1 , |ψ 2 , |ψ 4 , . . . , |ψ 2 k−1 , where 2 k = Ω(N ), one can reconstruct s in polynomial time with probability Ω(1).
Proof. We have
Apply the inverse quantum Fourier transform over Z N (which runs in poly(log N ) time [24] ) and measure in the computational basis. The Fourier transform of |s , namely
y=0 ω sy |s , has overlap squared with this state of 2 k /N , which implies the claim.
We aim to produce states of the form |ψ 2 j using a sieve that combines states to prepare new ones with more desirable labels. A basic building block is Algorithm 4, which can be used to produce states with smaller labels.
Lemma A.2. Algorithm 4 runs in time 2
k poly(log N ) and succeeds with probability
Proof. The running time is dominated by the brute force calculation in Step 6 and the projection in Step 10, both of which can be performed in time 2 k poly(log N ). The probability of aborting in Step 2 for any one
, so by the union bound, the overall probability of aborting in this step is at most k
′ (q is the measurement outcome, which is independent of j). By the uniformity of the x i s, each r j = x · y j mod 2B
Thus the probability that we abort in Steps 12-16 is 1/2, and conditioned on not aborting in these steps, x ′ ∈ R {0, 1, . . . , B ′ − 1}. Thus the algorithm is correct if it reaches Step 17. It remains to show that the algorithm succeeds with constant probability. We have already bounded the probability that we abort in Step 2 and Steps 12-16. Since y = 0 occurs with probability 
Abort with probability 
2
−k and at most one state |y ν can be unpaired (and this only happens when ν is odd), the projection in Step 10 fails with probability at most ν −1 + 2 −k ≤ 1/3 + o(1). We claim that the probability of aborting in Step 8 (i.e., the probability that ν = 1) is also bounded away from 1. Call a value of q bad if ν = 1. Since 0 ≤ x · y ≤ k(B − 1), there are at most kB/2B
′ possible values of q, and in particular, there can be at most kB/2B
′ bad values of q. Since the probability of any particular bad q is 1/2 k , the probability that q is bad is at most kB/B ′ 2 k+1 ≤ 1/2. This completes the proof.
We apply this combination procedure using the generalized sieve of Algorithm 5, which is equivalent to Regev's "pipeline of routines" [28] . Proof. If Algorithm 5 outputs a state from S m then it is correct. Since the algorithm never stores more than O(mk) states at a time, it uses space O(mk). It remains to show that the algorithm is likely to succeed using only k (1+o(1))m state preparations and combination operations.
Algorithm 5 Sieving quantum states
Input: Procedures to prepare states from a set S0 and to combine k states from Si−1 to make a state from Si with probability at least p for each i ∈ {1, . . . , m} Output: State from Sm 1: repeat 2:
while for all i we have fewer than k states from Si do 3:
Make a state from S0 4:
end while 5:
Combine k states from some Si to make a state from Si+1 with probability at least p 6: until there is a state from Sm If we could perform combinations deterministically, we would need 1 state from S m , k states from S m−1 ,
. . .
Since the combinations only succeed with probability p, we lower bound the probability of eventually producing (2k/p) m−i states from S i for each i ∈ {1, . . . , m} (so in particular, we produce one state from S m ). Given (2k/p) m−i+1 states from S i−1 , the expected number of successful combinations is p(2k/p) m−i+1 /k = 2(2k/p) m−i , whereas only (2k/p) m−i successful combinations are needed. By the Chernoff bound, the probability of having fewer than (2k/p) m−i successful combinations is at most e −p(2k/p) m−i . Thus, by the union bound, the probability that the algorithm fails is at most
so the probability of success is 1 − o(1). Finally, the number of states from S 0 is (2k/p) m = k (1+o (1))m and the total number of combinations is
When using the sieve, we have the freedom to choose the relationship between k and m to optimize the running time. Suppose that mk = (1 + o(1)) log 2 N (intuitively, to cancel log 2 N bits of the label), and also suppose that the combination operation takes time 2 k poly(log N ) (as in Lemma A.2). Then if we take k = c log 2 N log 2 log 2 N , we find that the overall running time of Algorithm 5 is 2
gives the best
. We now consider how to apply the sieve. To use Lemma A.1, our goal is to prepare states of the form |ψ 2 j for each j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ⌊log 2 N ⌋}. First we show how to prepare the state |ψ 1 in time L N ( 
we have B 0 = N , B m = 2, and 4k
Proof. Clearly B 0 = N , and the value of ρ is chosen so that B m = 2. For i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, we have
we have ρ − If N is odd, then division by 2 is an automorphism of Z N . Thus we can prepare |ψ 2 j by performing the above sieve under the automorphism x → 2 −j x. It follows that the abelian hidden shift problem in a cyclic group of odd order N can be solved in time
n is a power of 2. In this case, we first use a combination procedure that zeros out low-order bits, as described in Algorithm 6. We use the notation xS := {xz : z ∈ S} for any x ∈ Z and S ⊂ Z.
Lemma A.5. Algorithm 6 runs in time 2 k poly(log N ) and succeeds with probability
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma A.2. Again the running time is dominated by the brute force calculation in Step 3 and the projection in Step 7, both of which can be performed in time 2 k poly(log N ).
where now
and again k = ⌊ 1 2 log 2 N log 2 log 2 N ⌋. When making states in S i from states in S i−1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , m 1 }, we cancel k − 1 bits with k states, so the condition of Lemma A.5 is satisfied. For 
. So far we have covered the case where the group is A = Z N with N either odd or a power of 2. Now consider the case of a general finite abelian group A = Z N1 × · · · × Z Nt . By the Chinese remainder theorem, we can assume without loss of generality that each N i is either odd or a power of 2. Consider what happens if we apply Algorithm 4 or Algorithm 6 to one component of a product of cyclic groups. Suppose we combine k states of the form of Eqn. (ψ). For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let x i ∈ Z N1 × · · · × Z Nt denote the label of the ith state, with x i,j ∈ Z Nj for j ∈ {1, . . . , t}. To address the ℓth component of A, the combination procedure prepares a state
for some function h (a quotient in Algorithm 4 or a remainder in Algorithm 6). For j = ℓ, if x i,j = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} then x
, so components that are initially zero remain zero. Thus, if we can prepare states |ψ x with x ℓ ∈ R Z N ℓ (for any desired ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , t}) and all other components zero, we effectively reduce the problem to the cyclic case.
To prepare such states, we use a new combination procedure, Algorithm 7. Without loss of generality, our goal is to zero out the first t − 1 components, leaving the last one uniformly random from Z Nt . Algorithm 7 is similar to Algorithm 4, viewing the first t − 1 components of the label
Because we are merely trying to zero out certain components, we no longer require uniformity of the states output by the sieve, which simplifies the procedure and its analysis.
Lemma A.6. Algorithm 7 runs in time 2 k poly(log N ) and succeeds with probability
Proof. As in Lemma A.2 and Lemma A.5, the running time is dominated by the brute force calculation in Step 3 and the projection in Step 7, both of which can be performed in time 2 k poly(log N ).
, there are at most kB/B ′ possible values of q, and in particular, there can be at most kB/B ′ bad values of q. Since the probability of any particular bad q is 1/2 k , the probability that q is bad is at most kB/B ′ 2 k ≤ 1/2. This completes the proof.
To apply Algorithm 7 as the combination procedure for Algorithm 5, we require a straightforward variant of Lemma A.4, as follows. for all j ∈ {0, . . . , ⌊log 2 Ni⌋} do 5:
Apply Algorithm 5, first using Algorithm 7 to zero out all components except the ith one and then using Algorithm 4 under the ZN i -automorphism x → 2 −j x to produce a copy of |ψ (0,...,0,2 j ,0,...,0) (see the proof of Theorem A.1 for detailed parameters) 6: end for 7: else 8:
Let Ni = 2 n 9: for all j ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} do 10:
Apply Algorithm 5, first using Algorithm 7 to zero out all components except the ith one, then using Algorithm 6 to make states |ψ (0,...,0,x,0,...,0) with 2 j |x, and finally using Algorithm 4 to produce a copy of |ψ (0,...,0,2 j ,0,...,0) (see the proof of Theorem A.1 for detailed parameters) 11:
end for 12:
end if 13:
Apply Lemma A. Combining these ideas, the overall procedure is presented in Algorithm 8. 
.
Proof. In Step 1, if the structure of the group is not initially known, it can be determined in polynomial time using [9] . Given the structure of the group, for each term Z N we can easily factor N = 2 n M where M is odd; then Z N ∼ = Z 2 n × Z M , and we obtain a decomposition of the desired form.
Now suppose without loss of generality that we are trying to determine s t (i.e., i = t in Step 2). The main contribution to the running time comes from the sieves in Step 5 (for N t odd) and Step 10 (for N t a power of 2).
First suppose that N t is odd. It suffices to handle the case where j = 0, so we are making the state |ψ (0,...,0,1) . Then we apply Algorithm 5 with 
